Published in China Daily： 2024-04-22
Damage limitation
Jiang Fangfei
US is reinforcing the roles of Japan and the ROK in its 'hub-and-spoke' alliance system heightening tensions in East Asia
Since the Cold War, Japan and the Republic of Korea have been the two most crucial pillars in the United States-led "hub-and-spoke" alliance system in Asia-Pacific, regardless of Japan-ROK relations remaining strained.
The 2023 trilateral summit at Camp David witnessed a "historic qualitative change" in US-Japan-ROK cooperation.
The first change is the diversification of strategic goals among the three parties. During the Cold War, US-Japan-ROK trilateral cooperation mainly focused on the Soviet Union and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, while their renewed trilateral alliance simultaneously focuses on three perceived threats. The intensified "nuclear threat" from the DPRK and the Russia-Ukraine crisis are undoubtedly major contributing factors for the strengthening of the trilateral alliance, especially for the Japan-ROK rapprochement. But with the Joe Biden administration positioning China as the US' predominant long-term strategic rival, strategically containing China and economically outcompeting China has become another major motivation for the renewal of the trilateral cooperation.
The second change is reflected in the content and essence of the trilateral cooperation. Besides committing themselves to more frequent consultations between their leaders and senior officials, raising the tempo and sophistication of joint military exercises, and establishing the real-time sharing of intelligence on missile threats, the three countries also pledged to collaborate in areas such as building resilient supply chains, protecting emerging technologies and increasing economic security in the "Indo-Pacific" region. It demonstrates that the essence of their cooperation has been upgraded from a defensive military alliance to a more comprehensive and offensive alliance involving pragmatic cooperation in various fields targeting China.
The third change is the transformation of their cooperation structure. Since the Cold War, bilateral cooperation between the US and the other two countries has prevailed in the US-Japan-ROK alliance. However, with substantial progress in the Japan-ROK rapprochement and the construction of trilateral cooperation mechanisms, the alliance has transformed into a "strengthened minilateral network" that could be further nested and interact with other US-led minilateral and multilateral mechanisms such as the Quadrilateral Dialogue, Chip 4, G7, Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity, Maritime Security Program and so forth. In this way, the three parties can further expand and deepen their cooperation, while the US still maintains a leadership advantage in the trilateral alliance.
Many analysts think the prospects of the trilateral cooperation aren't so rosy, because of deep contradictions in Japan-ROK relations, uncertainties in the 2024 US presidential elections, as well as domestic divisions in the ROK regarding its relations with the US, Japan and China. Still, the Camp David Summit represents a perilous gambit to resurrect the specter of the Cold War and profoundly exert a series of adverse impacts on regional peace, stability and prosperity in East Asia.
First, it might further exacerbate geopolitical tensions in East Asia, especially on the Korean Peninsula. In recent years, both the frequency of the DPRK's missile tests and the heightened tensions on the Taiwan question are directly proportional to the degree of US involvement in East Asian affairs and the tremendous increase of its strategic deployment in Asia-Pacific. Further strengthening of US-Japan-ROK military cooperation, especially the US deployment of offensive weapons in Japan and the ROK will only make the situation even worse, escalate the regional arms race, and make East Asia a more fiercely contested theater for the major powers, resulting in a spiraling risk of conflict in the region.
Second, it might further impede regional economic integration in East Asia. Since the end of the Cold War, China, Japan and the ROK have been increasingly closer in trade and supply chain cooperation under a series of frameworks such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, 10+3 and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. The three parties also declared they would accelerate negotiations on a trilateral free trade agreement after the RCEP came into effect. However, as the US keeps tying the Taiwan question to the Russia-Ukraine conflict to monger the "China threat", and is wooing its regional allies to build an anti-China economic circle in the "Indo-Pacific", both Japan and the ROK have become less motivated to advance the China-Japan-ROK FTA negotiations and more active in "decoupling" from China, leading to a sharp decline in their trade volume with China, tremendous mutual economic losses, and more fragmented supply chains in the region.
Third, it has caused more difficulty for China's regional diplomacy. The US' reckless call for a coordinated stance with Japan and the ROK against Russia, the DPRK and China is creating opposing camps, and sowing discord between China and its neighboring countries. Consequently, China is not only facing a dilemma of appeasement or counterbalance, but also suffering from more strategic suspicions from neighboring countries, with pragmatic cooperation in various areas encountering greater challenges.
Therefore, in order to build a peaceful and prosperous East Asia in the right way, all regional stakeholders, especially the US,Japan and the ROK need to abandon the Cold War mentality, jointly develop their security and development concepts based on "equal consultations, constructive dialogues and win-win cooperation", rather than provoke confrontations and impede cooperation via the counterproductive "collective strategic deterrence".
First, all stakeholders need to jointly promote multilateral talks to ease tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Especially, the US and its allies need to stop imposing more economic sanctions, political pressure and military deterrence toward the DPRK, and deploying offensive weapons in the region, but cooperate with China in persuading the DPRK back to the negotiation table through alleviating its economic difficulties and security concerns.
Second, Japan and the ROK need to avoid becoming a pawn of the US in containing China, prevent the trend of over-securitization in their China policy, and enhance strategic trust with China through pragmatically promoting the China-Japan-ROK FTA negotiations, implementation and upgrading of the RCEP, and constructive dialogues with the DPRK.
Third, China should contribute to regional peace and prosperity by promoting multilateral talks on the Korean Peninsula, improving risk management in its surrounding waters, making every effort to stabilize China-US relations and seek peaceful reunification of Taiwan, and propelling its high-level institutional opening-up.