Does Property Rights Reform Improve the Efficiency of China’s State-owned Banks? Qian Wang, Xiaochu Feng* Abstract China’s state-owned banks have undergone radical changes over the past two decades, including partial privatization and listing in both the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and the Shanghai Stock Exchange. This paper evaluates the effects of these changes by analyzing the efficiency of Chinese banks over the period 1998–2012 using two frontier techniques and comparative analysis. The findings suggest that the performance and technical efficiency of the Big Four banks improved considerably after property rights reform, but this improvement is not sufficient to keep the banks at the production frontier. Tobit regressions confirm that static ownership effects are negative but that the property rights reform has had significant and positive effects on the technical efficiency of state-owned commercial banks. GDP growth and the financial crisis have had positive effects on the efficiency of Chinese banks, which is more significant for joint stock commercial banks than state-owned commercial banks. The results indicate the value of ownership reforms of state-owned asset management companies and insurance companies and the establishment of a countercyclical capital buffer. Key words: banking efficiency, China, property rights reform, state-owned bank
JEL codes: G21, G32, G38, N15